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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
of the husband does not abrogate separation agreements unless there is an
express provision to that effect.
6. Finally and most important, the termination of such agreements is
a question not of automatic revocation but of the intention of the parties
as gathered from the deed of separation as a whole and other circumstances.
John D. Glase
ASSIGNABILITY OF EASEMENTS IN GROSS IN PENNSYLVANIA
I
INTRODUCTION
The common theory in regard to easements in gross is that they are mere
personal interests in the land of another; that they are pzrsonal to the grantee
because not appurtenant to other premises; and that because of their personal
character are not assignable or inheritable, nor can they be made so by any
terms o1 the grant.' The last clause, "nor can they be made so by any terms
of the grant" is alleged by Professor Simes2 to have been a personal contri-
bution of Professor Washburne to the law of easements in gross. The latter
assumes, however, to rely on a statement of Sir William Blackstone as his
authority.3  In discussing ways as incorporeal hereditaments, the commentator
sa'd: "This may be grounded on a special privilege; as where the owner of
land g:ants to another a liberty of passing over his grounds, to go to church,
to market, or the like; in which case the gift or grant is particular, and
confined to the grantee alone; it dies with the person; and if the grantee
1Boatman v. Lasley (leading case) 23 Ohio State 614, (1873); 9 Ruling Case
Law 739; 19 Corpus Juris 867; Louisville & N.R.R. Co. v. Koelle, 104 Ill. 455, (1882);
Washbune on Easements, 4th ed., 11, 45; Tinicum Fishing Co. v. Carter, 61 Pa. 38,
(1869); Lindenmuth v. Safe Harbor W.P. Corp., 309 Pa. 58, (1932); Weekly v. Wild.
man, 1 Ld. Raym. 405 at p. 407, (1698); 14 L.R.A. 333, (excellent note on assign-
ability of easements in gross); Stockdale v. Yerden, 220 Mich. 444, 448, 190 N.W.
225, 226, (1922) quoting 9 R.C.L. 739. Cf. also Thomas v. Brooks, 188 Ky. 253, 221
S.W. 542, (1920); 30 Yale Law Journal 94; Atlantic Mills v. N.Y.C4 Railroad, 221
App. Div. 386, 223 N.Y. Supp. 206 (3rd Dept.), (1927); Waller v. Kildebrecht,
295 111. 116, 122, 128 N. E. 807, 809 (1920); Tide Water Pipe Co. v. Bell, 280
Pa. 104, 124 Ad. 351, 40 A.L,R. 1516 (1924); Cadwalader v. Bailey, 17 R. 1. 495,
23 At. 20, (1891).
2
Simes, "The Assignability of Easements in Gross in AmErican Law," 22 Mich.
LR. at 536, (1924).
SBlackstone's Com., Bk. II. 35.
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leaves the country, he can not assign over his right to any other, nor can
he justify taking another person in his company."
Sir William Blackstone, however, was not discussing a grant to
"Grantee, his heirs and assigns," but rather a grant to "Grantee, alone."
Such a grant unquestionably should be, and is, personal to the grantee,
and is not assignable or inheritable. It is, therefore, an injustice to Black-
stone, and a distortion of the true facts for Professor Washburne to have
considered Blackstone's statement as authority for the broader rule. The
Ohio court, nevertheless, in a leading case,' citing Blackstone and Wash-
burne, decided that an easement in gross could not be made assignable by
express terms of the grant.
An easement consists of two parts, one called the benefit, the other
the burden. The burden is attached to the servient tenement, and is well
named, since that tenement must suffer the burden of allowing the owner
of the benefit to do certain things on the land. The benefit, on the other
hand, is that interest enjoyed by the owner of the dominant tenement in
the case of easements appurtenant, and by the owner of the benefit without
a dominant tenement in case of easements in gross. The decisions are in
accord that the burden usually passes with the servient land. It is in regard
to assignability of the benefit that disagreement arises. The assignability
of the benefit is all that is considered in this note.
If the arbitrary rule of nonassignability of the benefit did not, at times,
bring about such unjust results, amounting to confiscation of whatevei
assets a decedent may have invested in easements in gross during his li'-
time, and which, when made, were intended to be assignable and inherit-
able, one could accept it without protest. Since, however, it frequently
results in injustice when heirs and assigns are excluded by the court, though
included in the terms of the grant, then the rule arouses warranted dis-
approval. Such disapproval is strengthened when it appears that the rule
probably originated in misinterpretation and misunderstanding.
So firmly has the rule against assignability become entrenched in the
common law through dicta and decisions5 that it would be difficult to per-
suade many a court to the contrary. The doctrine of nonassignability, how-
ever, has been repudiated in some jurisdictions6 and criticised adversely by
4 Boatman v. Lasley. 23 Ohio St. 614. (1873).
5 See footnote 1.
OPoul v. Mockley, 33 Wis. 482, (1873) where the court said: "We cannot see any
substantial reason for holding that an easement in gross cannot be assigned or trans.
ferred, especially when the language of the grant shows unmistakably that the intention
was that it should be enjoyed by the grantee, 'his heirs and assigns.' "
Cross v. Berlin Mills Co., 79 N.H. 116, 105 At. 411, (1918) where the court
said: "'The plaintiff's position, that the deed to Coe and Pingree conveyed to then
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writers.7 There are, nevertheless, writers who support and justify the rule
of nonassignability.S Numerically, more jurisdictions hold to nonassignability
while more writers argue for assignability. The present writer suggests that
like every status quo, the rule has found men to justify it. The reason
given in justification, such as the clog on title and surcharge arguments,
perhaps evolved after the rule was promulgated in order to preserve it, and
probably were not, as is often alleged, the cause for the development of
the rule ab initio.
II
ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST ASSIGNABILITY OF
EASEMENTS IN GROSS
A. CLOG ON TITLE
The most cogent argument against assignability of easements in gross
is that such an easement is a clog on title, that it prevents the free sale of the
land, that it creates an encumbrance on the fee far out of proportion in
value to the worth of the interest, and is, therefore, a restraint on alienation
that should be limited, at most, to the life of the grantee of the benefit.
Professor Clark9 calls such easements "most unfortunate encumbrances on
title". He fears such gross rights will be forgotten by their owners after
a period of years has elapsed, and then be remembered at some future
date, just in time to block an advantageous sale of the servient estate.
He suggests that heirs and assigns will become numerous and scattered,
so that formal releases will be difficult to secure. He considers a bill in
merely an easement in gross to maintain a boom or booms in the river opposite his
land for the purpose of floating logs, and consequently that it was not assignable cannot
be sustained. As the right was expressly granted to them, 'their heirs and assigns
forever' and as it was not otherwise limited or modified by other language in the deed,
no argument is. required in support of the proposition that the parties to the deed
understood it conveyed an inheritable and assignable right. The grantor's intention
thus clearly shown must be given effect . . . . unless there is some rule of law or
some principle of public policy that renders it unenforcible . . . . The absence of a
dominant estate in the grantee would seem to afford little reason why the grantor's ca-
pacity to convey an easement should be limited to an unassignable right."
Goodrich v. Burbank, 12 Allen (Mass.) 459, (1866) where the right to take water
from a spring through an aqueduct was held assignable, though not appurtenant.
Tide Water Pipe Co. v. Bell, 280 Pa. 104, (1924) where the right to lay a pipe
line was held to be assignable though apparently not appurtenant.
Shreve v. Mathis, 63 N.J. Eq. 170, 52 Atl. 234, (1902); Standard Oil Co. v.
Buchi, 72 N.J. Eq. 492, 66 Ad. 427. (1907); and see Comment (1923) 32 Yale
UJ. 813, 816,. a. 28.
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equity to quiet title too great a burden to place on the owner of the servient
land. Professor Clark and others sharing his view are right in maintaining
that an easement in gross may become a clog on title. The dispute arises'
over whether or not such easements are not worth running this occasional
risk.
In the first place Professor Clark is assuming the unusual situation
to illustrate his point. In most instances heirs or assigns could be found
and releases obtained if necessary. The heirs or assigns, moreover, would
be anxious to sell or use their interest rather than to forget and abandon it.
Easements appurtenant,1o indeed, and profits a prendre both appur-
tenant and in gross11 are assignable and inheritable. Since these similar
rights are alienable, it would seem reasonable that easements in gross should
be alienable also. In the assignable types of easements and profits just
mentioned, clogs on title have not proved unduly burdensome, and non-
assignability has not been resorted to as a remedy.
Another type of clog on title which is increasingly common today is
building restrictions in deeds and zoning ordinances. These encumbrances,
more limiting on the owners of the restricted land than most easements,
are not considered too great clogs on title to be allowed.
The recording systems, moreover, in use today for the recording of
deeds and encumbrances on title give notice to prospective purchasers, and
assist owners of easement rights in keeping exact records of them and
their terms.
The modern tendency of the law, moreover, in regard to interests in
land is to make more interests therein freely alienable. This is a com-
mercial age, whereas in the time of Blackstone and earlier, the English
law existed for the protection and benefit of a landed feudal aristocracy.
At that time it was necessary to keep large tracts of land intact and un-
encumbered to facilitate rendering feudal services. The rule of primogeni-
7 Simes, "The Assignability of Easements in Gross in American Law." 22 Mich.
L.R. 521; Vance, "The Assignability of Easements in Gross," 32 Yale L.J. 813; Note
writer, 17 Iowa L.R. 235; 2 Tiffany on Real Property, 2d ed. 1227, where Mr. Tiffany
says: "Nevertheless, it is somewhat difficult to see why, if, as appears to be the case,
a profit in gross is capable of passing by voluntary transfer and by descent, an easement
in gross should not be so capable. The courts could effectively protect the owner of the
servient tenement against an assignment to such a number of persons as unduly to
increase the burden thereon, and the heirs might well be regarded as holding in that
form of cotenancy which exists in the case of the descent of land itself.
8Clark, "The Assignability of Easements, Profits and Equitable Restrictions," 38
Yale L. J. 139, (1928).
9Clark, p. 144.
1019 C. J. 93 .
112 Tiffany on Real Property 1224; Washburne on Eawmcats 4th ed. 45; Jows
on Easements, sec. 33; 14 Cyc. 1144; 19 C.J. 870.
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ture in inheritance law was designed to accomplish this purpose. Now,
indeed, as the rule of primogeniture no longer exists in Pennsylvania, so,
likewise, the fee has been allowed to become more encumbered. The pre-
sent tendency is to make many more interests in land alienable than the
mere right of possession of the soil. To illustrate, consider the sale of a
nonpossessory interest in land, an easement, apart from either dominant
or servient estate. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently decided a
case allowing the sale, apart from the dominant estate, of the right to
withdraw subjacent support from surface land. 12  The gross right sold
in this case has been called colloquially the "third estate". Thus the
law is allowing to a greater extent than ever before the sale of interests
in land, gross rights which are of comparatively limited value unless
assignable and inheritable. The clog on title argument, therefore, pictures
a difficulty which may arise only occasionally in unusual cases, and an
argument which was born in, and should have died with, the feudal
Middle Ages, and an objection which is overbalanced by the utility of
alienability of easements in gross.
B. SURCHARGING THE SERVIENT ESTATE-
The other major argument against assignability of easements in gross is that
of surcharging the servient tenement. By surcharge, in this instance, i.s
meant excessive user by the owners of the gross right. The danger threat-
ened under this argument is that where an easement in gross has been
granted to "X, his heirs and assigns," in time the heirs and assigns will
become so numerous that, whereas formerly only X used the easement,
now hundreds of heirs or assigns will enjoy it. The Ohio court in the
leading case of Boatman v. Lasley'3 has stated strongly the practical dif-
ficulty which gives rise to this fear of surcharge. The court said there:
"If such a right be an inheritable estate, how will the heirs take? In sev-
eralty, in joint tenancy, coparcenary, or as tenants in common? If it be
assignable what limit can be placed on the power of alienation? To whom
and to how many may it be transferred? Why not to the public at large,
and thus convert into a public way that which was intended to be a private
and exclusive way only?"
The author of a leading article an assignability of easements in gross
14
has answered clearly this argument of surcharge. He replies to the Ohio
lZPernan v. Jones, 256 Pa. 416, 100 Atd. 1043, (1917).
1323 Ohio St. 614, (1873).
14Sirnes, "The Assignability of Easments in Gross in American Law," 22 Mich.
L R. 527.
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court by saying that the court is not distinguishing dearly between a grantee's
power to take title to an easement in gross and his ability to enjoy it
under the terms of the easement; that ten thousand people may acquire
jointly title to a one room house, yet could not enjoy their property at
the same time; that there are other means, viz., an action for damages
or an injunction in a proper case, of preventing surcharge than denying
title to the grantee.
The opponents of assignability have pictured the spectre of surcharge
in its most terrorizing form. It can not be too strongly emphasized that
surcharge, like dog on title, will arise but seldom, and will not be the usual
occurrence. For the reason that difficulty may occasionally arise in the use
of the easement, alienation should not be forbidden entirely. Profits a
prendre in gross are not for that reason inalienable. Surcharge is prevent-
ed in regard to profits a prendre in gross by the rule that new owners
must exercise such profit only together as "one stock".15 It would seem,
therefore, that rather than deny title to heirs and assigns, the law should
require them to enjoy their gross right as "one stock", in common, and
not in severalty, or otherwise limit the use which assigns may make of
the easement.
Another point which exponents of nonassignability invariably over-
look is that the owner of the servient land can always protect himself
when he creates the easement in the first instance by granting it to
"Grantee, alone". It is entirely optional with a grantor whether he shall
include heirs and assigns or not. When the grantor can by his own
contract carry out his own wish, why should the law protect him further?
For it to do so is carrying the paternalism of the law too far. "Surely,"
as Professor Simes has said, 16 "the prevention of surcharge is for the
protection of the owner of the servient estate and no one else. If he
is willing to have the easement pass to heirs and assigns and so declares.
why should the law prevent him?"
The problem of surcharge is, moreover, more theoretical than real.
"It does not seem to me, however," says one of the supporters of non-
assignability,17 "that this issue (surcharge) is emphasized in the decisions.
The only reference looking in this direction I have discovered is one in
Boatman v. Lasley, 23 Ohio State at 618, which I read as being more directed
to the difficulties as to the title than any question of excessive user."
Professor Clark bases his objection to the assignability of easements in gross
on the possible clog on title difficulty, and disparages the notion that
VsMountjoy's Case (leading case) Co. Lit. 164 b., (1589).
IsSimes, p. 526.
17Clark, p. 145.
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surcharge is important. He very aptly remarks' s that rarely will it matter
whether a way is used three times a day or six if it must be kept open,
or whether water is drawn through a pipe continuously or only on alter-
nate days, if the pipe must be allowed to remain where it is. It is the
feeling of that writer, though he does not favor assignability, that surcharge
of the servient estate is not a momentous objection to assignability. Mr.
Simes, on the other hand, who favors assignability, 19 considers the prob-
lem of surcharge his only great obstacle to surmount. That Mr. Simes
has surmounted it is admitted by his opponent Mr. Clark, 20 where he
says: "The objection (of surcharge) he (Mr. Simes) successfully answers.-
It would seem, therefore, that with surcharge successfully answered by as
competent a teacher of property law as Professor Simes, and with Professor
Clark not considering it a controlling argument anyway, that it would
be safe to say that fear of surcharge should not stand in the way of
allowing persons to make easements in gross assignable when they desire
to do so.
C. VALUELESS AND UNIMPORTANT
Another objection to assignability is that easements in gross are usually
of small value.2 1 The argument implies that such easements are of so
little value and importance that it is immaterial whether the heirs and
assigns ever get them or not. Fortunately, however, not all persons
concur with this view. One writer says: "  "The infrequency of totally
valueless easements in gross also detracts from the argument against their
assignability. A right which yields no substantial gain is not likely to be
the frequent subject of a bargain. At best, such a right would make a
poor gift and need rarely be feared as an outstanding encumbrance on
the land." To illustrate that easements in gross may be of great value a
recent case is apropos. 23  In this case certain summer resort boating, fish-
ing and bathing rights in gross, worth many thousands of dollars were
considered sufficiently valuable and important to be the subject of pro-
tracted litigation. At best, the argument that the easement is of little
value is weak, and indicates a tendency to disparage, rather than to evaluate
properly, such rights.. The law, moreover, on principle should not deny
protection to a legal right merely because it is of less value than some
'sClark, p. 146.
19Simes, p. 525.
2 0CIark, p. 145.
21Clark, p. 144.
2
2
Note, 17 Iowa L.R. 238.
SMiller v. Miller, 118 Pa. Superior, (1935).
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other right. If that were the practice only expensive rights would be pro.
tected by the courts.
.2IKLSSED INTENTION OF BOTH .,ANTOR AND GRANTEE IN THE DEED
The strongest argument in favor of assignability of easements in gross
is that both grantor and granted intended that the easement should be as-
signable and inheritable. By the use of appropriate words, "heirs and
assigns," the parties to the original grant creating the easement in gross
have shown that they desired the easement to extend beyond the first
grantee. One purpose of the law is to hold men to their agreements.
and in the absence of a strong public policy or some rule of law forbidding
it, contracts should be enforced as written. The arguments setting forth
clog on title and surcharge as reasons of policy against assignability have
been discussed. No other objections have been made in the name of
policy. It is hard to think of a stronger argument in favor of assignability
than that the terms of the contract, grant or deed command that the right
be assignable and inheritable.
E. EASEMENTS IN GROSS ARE PROPERTY RICHTS
In England no easements in gross are recognized by that name. Lord
Cairns has said:24 "There can be no such thing according to our law ...
as what I may term an easement in gross. An easement must be con-
nected with a dominant tenement." It is contended, however, that the
English do recognize some easements in gross, but refuse to call them by
that name.25
In the United States, however, courts generally do recognize ease-
ments in gross as property rights.2 6  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
recognizes that easements in gross may be acquired by prescription. 27  Jus-
tice Sharswood in the Tinicum case 28 comments that there is a difference
in the amount of evidence required to establish by prescription an ease-
ment in gross and one appurtenant. It seems as though he considered
the gross right a property right, for personal licenses are not acquired
by prescription. In another Pennsylvania case"9 the court said: "There
2 4 Rangeley v. Midland Rail Co. L.R. 3 Ch. 311, (1808).
252 Tiffany on Real Property, 2d. ed., 1224.
262 Tiffany on Real Property, 2d ed., 1224; Washburne on Easements, 4th ed, 45;
Jones on Easements, sec. 23.
2 7 Tinicum Fishing Co. v. Carter, 61 Pa. at 40, (1869).
2861 Pa. at 40.
29Rd~ef & Sones v. Wayne S. W. P. Co.. 232 Pa. ;82, 81 At. 3M, (1911).
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is a class of rights which one may have in the land of another, without
their being exercised in connection with other land, and which are known
as easements in gross." No American case holds that easements in gross
are not rights in rem.3" If easements in gross may be acquired by pre-
scription, and are generally considered as property rights, it follows that
they should be alienable, since the modern trend in the law is to regard
interests in property as alienable in the absence of strong reasons to the
contrary. 31 As has been observed, 2 a number of cases, basing their de-
cision on the assumption that such easements are property rights, have
considered easements in gross as assignable.
F. SIMILAR INTERESTS ARE ASSIGNABLE
As has been stated, the similar interests of profit a prendre in gross, 3
and the somewhat similar interests of both profits 4 and easements33 ap-
purtenant are both assignable and inheritable. There does not seem to
be much difference, except in degree, between an easement and a profit
in gross. Of the two, the profit is more of a burden on. the servient
land, and as an encumbrance on the fee, should be considered the less
desirable on grounds of public policy. Strangely, however, the profit a prendre
in gross is not considered a very undesirable encumbrance, whereas the
easement in most jurisdictions is held to be too great an encumbrance on
the servient land to be pemitted for more than the lifetime of the grantee.
Such is the inconsistency of the law!
III
THE PENNSYLVANIA CASES FROM TINICUM FISHING COMPANY
v. CARTER to LINDENMUTH v. SAFE HARBOR WATER POWER
CORPORATION
The earliest Pennsylvania authority usually cited for nonassignability
of easements in gross is the case of Tinicum Fishing Company v. Carter."
In that case" Justice Sharswood obiter dictum declares that a fishing right
soSimes, p. 530.
3SGray, Restraints on Alienation, 2d ed., p. 2; 3 Tiffany on Real Property, 2d
ed. sec. 586.
32Footnote 6.
SSpootnote 11.
I 4 Footnote 11.
36Footnote 10.
8661 Pa. 21, (1869).
17At pee 38.
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in gross may be created. He then considers what the nature of such a
right would be. In his speculations, which appear in the opinion, he enter-
tains quotations from Chancellor Kent 3s and Professor Washburne39  to
the effect that easements in gross are unassignable and can not be made
either assignable or inheritable by any terms of the grant. The learned
justice, however, was not obliged to decide the question' of assignability
of easements in gross in that case, and wisely refrained from committing
himself thereon. He merely cites several authorities and offers their
opinions for whatever they may be worth.
The Tinicum case, moreover, is treated as involving a profit a prendre
and not an easement in gross. 40  It is also peculiar in that it involves the
acquisition of the prescriptive right in the navigable Delaware River, the
bed of which belongs to the United States, and to which different rules
apply in regard to acquiring rights by prescription than in the Common-
wealth of Pennsylvania on privately owned soil.4 1  It is evident, therefore,
that the Tinicum case is not decisive on the problem of the assignability
of easements in gross.
There have been two Pennsylvania cases which quote the nonassign-
ability dicta of the Tinicum case with approval, Commonwealth v. Zim-
merman,42  and Lindenmuth v. Safe Harbor Water Power Corporation.-"
The Zimmerman case, however, involves a grant to a grantee alone, and
not to heirs and assigns also. It is, therefore, of little aid in solving the
problem of grants including heirs and assigns. There is, however, in that
case a very noteworthy statement in this regard. The court says: 44 "The
clause in the said deed contains no words creating an estate of inheritance,
the words 'heirs and assigns,' or their equivalent not appearing in the
clause." It is apparent that when composing that sentence, Judge Koch
of the Superior Court felt that if the words "heirs and assigas" had been
used, an inheritable estate would have been created.
In the recent Lindenmuth case Justice Maxey quotes at length fron
Justice Sharswood's opinion in the Tinicum case to the effect that ease-
ments in gross are unassignable. The dictum is extensive and rather
positive. The Justice, however, recognizes that the view favoring as-
signability exists, 4" and leaves the question open. He says:4 6  "While
883 Kent Corn. 420.
8 9Washburne on Easements, p. 8.
4061 Pa. at 39.
4161 Pa. at 36.
4Z 56 Pa. Superior Court 513, (1913).
43309 Pa. 58, 163 At. 159, 89 A.L.R. 1180, (1932).
4456 Pa. Superior at 315.45309 Pa. at 63.
48309 Pa. at 64.
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the precise question of the assignability of such easements (in gross) has
never been definitely raised in the pleadings of any case reaching the
appellate courts of Pennsylvania, there is very weighty Pennsylvania
judicial dictum against the assignability of easements in gross." Later
in the opinion Justice Maxey declares: "However, in the Tinicum Fishing
Co. case the subject of controversy was not an easement in gross, but a
profit a prendre." In the next paragraph he continues, "The decision
of the case now before us does not turn on the question of the assignability
of easements in gross, for the easement.. .was... appurtenant." The Lindenmuih
case, therefore, of necessity leaves the question of assignability of easement3
in gross uncertain, but unfortunately ignores the earlier case of Tide Water
Pipe Company v. Bell,47 in which an easement, apparently in gross but not
called such, was held to be assignable by Justice Simpson.
In the Tide Water case the grantors conveyed to one Warren, "his
heirs and assigns," a right of way upon: and through their land for the pur-
pose of constructing from time to time one or more pipe lines. Warren
apparently had no dominant estate to which this right could be appurtenant,
nor does it appear that the grantors intended that it should be appurtenant.
Later Warren assigned his interest to the Tide Water Pipe Company, which
constructed several pipe lines. Subsequently one Bell, defendant, disputed
the right of Warren to make the assignment to the Tide Water Company.
Justice Simpson says: 48  "Defendant contends that the right of way is an
easement in gross, which is not assignable, and hence Warren's attempt to
L .f lIal.. I it '. , j JaIIItaL. J ewa rJi Ju WAIf,.I . V ILl! till. .JL LIJ,.. .Jj iit fUan
minority below disagree, 'because the words of its creation made it both
assignable and inheritable, and thus extended its life beyond the grantee' ...
It may be said that, in this State, WHERE A CONFLICT EXISTS BE-
TWEEN A NAME ATTEMPTED TO BE APPLIED TO A PARTICULAR
CONTRACT. AND THE LANGUAGE OF THE CONTRACT ITSELF, WE
REJECT THE NAME AS INAPPLICABLE AND DO NOT ELIMINATE
WORDS FROM THE CONTRACT.49 In the present instance the grant was to
'B. F. Warren, his heirs and assigns,' and must be interpreted to mean just what
it says."
While the Supreme Court does not definitely say that the right involved
is an easement in gross, the language in re assignability is broad enough
to include easements in gcoss as well as those appurtenant. As a matter of
fact the court purposely avoids calling the right by any very definite name.50
The word "servitude", 5 1 however, is used in several places to mean "ease-
47280 Pa. 104, 124 At. 351, 40 A.L.R. 1516. (1924).
49280 Pa. at 112.
4 9 Italics and capitals added.
50;80 P&. *t I10. ! 114.
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ment in gross". The court apparently prefers to reserve the name "ease-
ment in gross" to apply, as a legal conclusion, to an unassignable right. The
result of such a play on words is that when the parties desire an unassign-
able right the court will call it an easement in gross, but when the parties
have shown by the use of appropriate words that they want an assignable
and inheritable right, the court will call it a "servitude" or perhaps not
name the right at all, but, nevertheless, allow assignabilityi and protect
the right. It is apparent in the Tide Water case, moreover, that it is
immaterial in the mind of Justice Simpson whether the right be in gross
or appurtenant, that he would have allowed assignability regardless, and
that he distinctly refrained from calling the right an easement in gross.
The inevitable conclusion which must be drawn is that there are, in this
Commonwealth, rights which are easements in gross in all but name, and
which are both assignable and inheritable.
Even in the Lindenmuth case, in which Justice Maxey quotes co-
piously from the Tinicum dicta, Justice Simpson, in a concurring opinion
in which Justices Schaffer and Linn concur, bases his decision on a much
broader ground than does Justice Maxey. Justice Simpson says: 52  "Alleging,
as its only answer on this point, that the... agreement provides for an
easement in gross does not aid plaintiff, since the agreement, no matter
by what technical name it is called, in unmistakable language excludes all
idea of this hoped for recovery of damages: Tide Water Pipe Co. v.
Bell, 280 Pa. 104, 112." It seems clear that what the learned Justice meant
here was that since the words "heirs and assigns" appear in the deed, the
easement, though plaintiff should prove it to be in gross, still would be
assignable.
It is unfortunate that in the Tide Water case Justice Simpson did not
have the courage or the desire to say what he apparently assumed, that
the easement was in gross, and thus make his decision incontrovertible.
His meaning, nevertheless, is unmistakable, that the words in the contract
govern rather than the name applied to such a contract, that the terms of
the grant or deed determine assignability, and not the questionable and
disputed attributes of what is known commonly as an easement in gross.
When the precise issue of assignability of these gross rights comes to the
attention of the Supreme Court again, it is hoped that that court will
follow the profoundly sensible and liberal lead of Justice Simpson in
the Tide Water decision, rather than the parenthetical dicta of the more
recent Lindenmut case.
Kennard Lewis
51280 Pa. at 113, 114 esp.
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